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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICKY PALMER, : Case No. 890583-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from judgment and 
conviction for Retail Theft, a third degree felony. The trial court 
denied Petitioner's Motion to Suppress after an evidentiary hearing 
held on August 23, 1989. R. 27; T. 81. Immediately thereafter, 
Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988), explicitly preserving his 
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
R. 37; T. 81-2. 
On November 14, 1990, this Court issued its opinion in 
State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990). See Addendum A for a 
copy of this Court's opinion. In its decision, this Court held that 
the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the x-ray, 
but remanded the case to the trial court for a "factual 
determination of whether the ring would have been inevitably 
discovered and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate". 
Palmer 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. This Petition for Rehearing 
addresses the second aspect of this Court's holding. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
reh 'Q. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions . . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 
1913), the Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will establish 
that, applying these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the fact statement contained in the opinion, this 
Court failed to mention any facts relevant to the State's argument 
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that the ring would inevitably be discovered. The facts relevant to 
that argument are as follows: 
In the trial court, the State focused on "exigent 
circumstances" as "what the case hinges on." T. 69. Without 
developing any argument or citing any case law, the prosecutor 
nominally alluded to the inevitable discovery doctrine, stating in 
passing that "there is almost an inevitability of discovery". T. 71. 
Sgt. Mayo, the officer in charge of the investigation and 
the officer who made the decision that Mr. Palmer should be x-rayed 
(T. 60), testified that after he went to Sears and assessed the 
situation, he did the following: 
I contacted the Salt Lake County Jail and advised 
them we had a suspect that we believed had 
swallowed the ring and if there were facilities 
available to keep him under surveillance and if 
the ring were passed, we could recover it. They 
advised me it was not—they did not have the 
capability. 
Sgt. Mayo also testified as follows: 
MR. BRADSHAW (Defense Counsel): You said the jail 
indicated to you—Who did you speak to in the 
jail, first of all, if you recall? 
SGT. MAYO: I asked for a jail supervisor and the 
gentleman came out and identified himself, but I 
don't recall who it was. 
Q: They told you they did not have a facility in 
which Mr. Palmer could be kept? 
A: No, what they advised me he didn't have the 
capability to watch him until he passed the ring 
and retained that and searched through it. 
Q: So, in terms, did you ask if they had a room 
which he would be kept in isolation? 
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A: Yes. I explained the situation to him. We 
had a subject who we believed had swallowed the 
ring and did they have the capability of keeping 
him under surveillance until he passed the ring, 
and then recovering that so that we could go 
through it and recover the ring. 
Q: They indicated they didn't have someone who 
could watch him? 
A: They didn't say they didn't have the 
capability. 
Q: Ultimately, he was placed in isolation at the 
Salt Lake County Jail? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: Do you know if the ring was recovered? 
A: I don't. 
Q: Did you ask them if they had a room in which 
he could be kept absent someone to watch him 24 
hours a day? 
A: No, I didn't. I explained our problem and 
asked them if they could help us. No. 1, I wanted 
him kept under surveillance. And No. 2, he had 
some sort of capability of recovering the feces so 
that we could go through it. And they advised 
they didn't have that capability. 
Q: I guess, maybe we are not communicating, but 
you wanted someone to watch him 24 hours a day. 
What is the problem in your estimation with just 
putting him in a room where he can't dispose of 
the feces, where he is in complete lockdown in 
isolation and keeping him there? 
A: Well-
Q: Why doesn't that serve your purpose? 
A: Obviously, we have to have him pass the feces. 
Q: I understand that. 
A: What we have is the capability of recovering 
the feces so that it is not flushed away. 
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Q: The feces can't go out of the room. Feces 
can't go out of the room. He is kept in the 
room. Why do you have to have someone watch him 
24 hours a day? 
A: Well., let's assume he just passed the feces 
and he goes through it himself and he recovers the 
ring, and then secretes it into his body again 
somehow. 
Q: Okay, assume that. 
A: All right. 
Q: You have still got him in the room, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The ring and Mr. Palmer are still in the room? 
A: How long can we keep him in a situation as you 
described, where you keep passing the ring and 
recovering the ring and secreting it again, until 
we reach a situation where we have, in fact, 
violated some sort of rights by being able to 
recover the ring ourselves. 
Q: Did you consider the option? 
A: Basically, I presented the jail with my 
problem and asked them if they could provide the 
capability of recovering the ring for us, if it 
was passed through his feces. They told me they 
did do that. 
Q: My question is, did you consider the option? 
The one I purposed(sic) where he is kept in 
isolation without someone watching him? 
A: Well, no. not specifically because— 
Q: Did vou purpose (sic) that option to the jail? 
A: No. As I said. I advised them of our problem 
and they best knowing their capabilities and so 
forth, thev advised me that thev could not do that. 
Q: Did you in the course of your investigation 
and your decision as to how to proceed, seek and 
find information in regards to how long the ring 
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would be inside of an individual if they had, in 
fact, swallowed it? 
A: No. 
... 
T. 32-35. Following defense counsel's line of questioning, the 
State did not ask any questions of Sgt. Mayo on redirect 
examination. The parties also presented a stipulation that after 
the x-ray located the ring inside Mr. Palmer, officers placed him in 
isolation, but not under observation. T. 62. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence in the present case is susceptible to a 
single factual determination. First, the evidence unequivocally 
demonstrates that an independent investigation was not in place when 
the unconstitutional x-ray was taken. Second, even if the "routine 
booking procedure" alternative is applicable in the instant case, 
the State presented no evidence regarding routine booking procedures 
at the Salt Lake County Jail. The evidence which was presented is 
susceptible only to a finding that isolating and keeping a defendant 
in constant surveillance is not part of the routine booking 
procedure. 
Because a finding either that an independent 
investigation was in place or that routine booking procedures would 
have led to the discovery of the ring would be clearly erroneous 
given the evidence introduced at the hearing and the State's failure 
to sustain its burden, remand is an unnecessary and time-consuming 
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procedure. This Court should make the only possible factual finding 
and legal conclusion without remanding the case. 
Alternatively, if this Court does remand the case to the 
trial court, it should clarify that the remand is for factual 
findings only, and not for a new evidentiary hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECORD REGARDING THE INEVITABILITY 
OF DISCOVERY IS CAPABLE OF ONLY ONE FACTUAL 
FINDING. 
In discussing the inevitable discovery doctrine as it 
applies to the instant case, this Court stated: 
This court cannot properly determine the outcome 
of a fact sensitive issue where the record below 
is not clear or uncontroverted, or capable of only 
one finding. (citation omitted). 
Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45. 
Contrary to the implication of this statement, the record 
in the present case is capable of only one factual finding and legal 
conclusion—that the State failed to establish that the ring would 
inevitably have been discovered. 
In his reply brief, Mr. Palmer discussed the inevitable 
discovery doctrine at length. He pointed out that Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 459, 456-7 (1984), the lead case in the area, requires 
that an independent line of investigation be in place at the time 
the constitutional violation occurred for the doctrine to apply. 
See Appellants Reply Brief at 10-11, 14-15. See also United 
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir 1984) ("if 
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evidence is obtained by illegal conduct, the illegality can be cured 
only if the police possessed and were pursuing lawful means of 
discovery at the time the illegality occurred". (emphasis added).)* 
A few courts have extended the inevitable discovery 
doctrine to include situations where routine booking procedures 
would have led to the discovery of the evidence. See United 
States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1988)(discovery not 
inevitable since "the record reveals no evidence that [inventory] 
searches were an invariable, routine procedure in the booking and 
detention of a suspect . . . " ) ; United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 
1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986)("routine booking procedure and inventory 
would inevitably have resulted in discovery of cocaine"); United 
States v. Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)("The 
government can meet its burden by establishing that, by following 
routine procedures, the police would have inevitably uncovered 
evidence."). 
Courts have clarified that the fact that officers could 
have pursued an independent investigation is not enough; the 
government must establish that it would have done so. See 
Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1400; see also, 4 La Fave, Search and 
Seizure. §11.4(a) at 384. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in the 
instant case is capable of only one factual finding regarding an 
independent investigation. Sgt. Mayo, the officer in charge, 
clearly stated as set forth in the Statement of Facts in this brief, 
that he chose to have Mr. Palmer x-rayed rather than pursue the 
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independent approach of isolating him. If the trial judge were to 
find on remand that Sgt. Mayo was pursuing an independent 
investigation at the time the illegal x-ray was taken, such a 
finding would be clearly erroneous given the testimony set forth 
above. 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed whether the "routine booking procedure" alternative is 
applicable in this jurisdiction. The applicability of such an 
alternative is a legal question; if it is not applicable, the trial 
court's factual finding as to whether routine booking procedures 
would have unearthed the ring is irrelevant. 
However, even if the "routine booking procedure" 
alternative is applicable, the State failed to establish during the 
evidentiary hearing that routine booking procedures would have 
unearthed the ring. The State presented absolutely no evidence as 
to what comprises routine booking procedures in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Although Sgt. Mayo testified regarding his attempts to 
ascertain whether the jail had the capability to isolate and monitor 
Mr. Palmer, his testimony did not relate to routine booking 
procedures. It related, instead, to a special request by an officer 
overseeing an investigation. This testimony, therefore, related to 
the issue of whether an independent investigation was being pursued 
at the time of the constitutional violation and not to whether 
routine booking procedures would have led to the discovery of the 
ring. 
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In addition, the stipulation introduced by counsel did 
not address routine booking procedures. Instead, it covered the 
actions taken at the jail after the ring was discovered pursuant to 
the unlawful x-ray. Where the subsequent recovery of the evidence 
is triggered by or the fruit of the illegal search, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine does not apply. See People v. Knctpp, 422 N.E.2d 
531, 536 (N.Y. App. 1981); see also Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 
1396, quoting United States v. Boatwright. 822 F.2d 862, 864-5 (9th 
Cir. 1987)("This doctrine requires that 'the fact or likelihood that 
makes the discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other than 
those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'"). 
Furthermore, the evidence introduced during the 
evidentiary hearing established that the jail did not have the 
"capability" to isolate and monitor Mr. Palmer. If the jail did not 
have the capability to isolate and monitor a defendant when a 
special request is made by an investigating officer, it certainly 
does not isolate and monitor defendants as a routine part of the 
booking procedure. 
Given the fact that the State did not introduce any 
evidence regarding routine booking procedures and the evidence is 
uncontroverted that the jail did not have the capability to isolate 
and monitor a defendant, there is simply no evidence in the record 
which demonstrates that routine booking procedures would have led to 
the discovery of the ring; the State, therefore, did not sustain its 
burden of establishing that the ring would have been found as part 
of routine booking procedures. 
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If the trial court were to make a factual finding on 
remand that the State sustained its burden of establishing that the 
ring would have been located as part of routine booking procedures, 
such a finding would be clearly erroneous. 
Because the State failed to present any evidence during 
the evidentiary hearing that an independent investigation was in 
place or that routines booking procedures would have led to the 
discovery of the ring, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not 
applicable to this case. Remanding this case for a factual 
determination serves no purpose and delays the ultimate disposition 
of this in custody defendant's case. 
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this court 
reconsider its decision to remand the instant case for a factual 
determination as to whether the ring would have been inevitably 
discovered and hold instead that the evidence is capable of a single 
factual determination which leads to the legal conclusion that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the instant case. 
POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT THE 
REMAND IS FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS ONLY AND THAT A NEW 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
As this Court acknowledged in the opinion in this case, 
the State has the burden to establish that the warrantless search in 
this case was lawful. State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv Rep at 43. 
That burden applies to the inevitability of the discovery as well as 
the existence of exigent circumstances. See United States v. 
Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d at 1399. 
- 11 -
Because the State has the burden and an evidentiary 
hearing has already been held, this Court should, at the very least, 
clarify in its opinion that the remand for ci "factual determination" 
is solely an effort to obtain factual findings from the trial judge 
and does not present an opportunity for the State to introduce 
additional evidence as to whether the ring would have been 
inevitably discovered. If the State failed to sustain its burden 
during the evidentiary hearing held on August 23, 1989, it should 
not be given a second chance, along with the benefit of hindsight 
and the appellate briefs filed in this case, to now supplement the 
record with additional testimony, Mr. Palmer respectfully requests 
that this Court, at the very least, revise the opinion in this case 
to clarify that the remand is for factual findings only,and not for 
a new evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction without remanding the case for a factual 
determination; alternatively, Mr. Palmer requests that this Court 
clarify that the remand is for factual findings only and not for an 
additional evidentiary hearing. 
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/<? DATED this ' I day of December, 1990. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM A 
42 Thomas v. Johnson 147 Utah Adv> Rep. 40 
CODE#00 
Provo, Utah 
inspect and value the property. Koplin testified 
at trial that his appraisal of the property as 
having a fair market value of $31,800 was as 
of the date of the trustee's sale. His valuation 
opinion was rejected by the trial court prim-
arily because he admitted not knowing the 
condition of the property at the time of the 
sale and not entering the attic of the home, 
where severe structural problems were evident. 
Furthermore, Johnson could have attended the 
trustee's sale and made a fixed-dollar bid to 
protect his own interests, but he chose not to 
because he believed that the fair market value 
of the property was greater that his indebted-
ness. Because no other bidders attended the 
sale, Thomas's bid did not scare off other 
potential purchasers of the property to 
Johnson's prejudice. Any injury to Johnson's 
interests resulted from his own inaction and 
imprudent judgment, not from any noncom-
pliance with the statutes governing nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales. We therefore conclude that 
the trial court properly declined to set aside 
the trustee's sale in this case. 
In light of Johnson's failure to demonstrate 
any clear error, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52, we 
also reject Johnson's challenge to the trial 
court's finding that the fair market value of 
the property on the date of the trustee's sale 
was $21,750. The other issues raised by 
Johnson are completely meritless and we deem 
it unnecessary to address them further. See State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 
1989). 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, 
and the case is remanded for the trial court's 
determination and award of reasonable atto-
rney fees, authorized by section 57-1-32, 
that appellees have incurred on appeal. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Johnson also argues briefly that the sale is invalid 
because the trustee did not require the bid to be 
"payable in lawful money of the United States at the 
time of sale/ as allegedly instructed in the trust 
deed. The trust deed, however, was not offered or 
admitted into evidence at trial. In any event, we 
believe that a credit bid by the beneficiary of a trust 
deed is a bid "payable in lawful money of the 
United States," even though the trustee does not go 
through the meaningless motions of taking, with one 
hand, actual money from a person as the highest 
bidder at the trust sale and then returning the 
money with the other hand to the same person as 
the trust deed beneficiary. 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ricky PALMER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890583-CA 
FILED: November 14, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
James C. Bradshaw and Joan C. Watt, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, and 
Judith Atherton, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant Ricky Palmer appeals from a 
judgment and conviction for retail theft, a 
third degree felony. Defendant filed a motion 
to suppress certain evidence obtained from a 
warrantless X-ray search of his body. After 
the motion was denied, defendant entered a 
conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Stare v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Under Sery, defendant explicitly preserved his 
right to appeal the denial of the motion to 
suppress. On appeal, he argues that the war-
rantless X-ray search violated his rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure. We 
reverse and remand. 
On May 3, 1989, at about 6:00 p.m., a 
Sears security guard was called to the store's 
diamond counter where a salesclerk informed 
her that a customer had just taken a diamond 
ring, leaving a paste ring in its place. When 
the salesclerk called security, the customer had 
left the diamond counter and was exiting the 
store. The security guard examined the paste 
ring and then proceeded after the customer, 
defendant Ricky Palmer. 
The security guard followed defendant out 
to the store parking lot and waited until a 
second security guard arrived. The security 
guard then asked defendant to return to the 
store with them. Inside the store, defendant 
was informed that the security guards believed 
he had switched a paste ring for a real 
diamond ring belonging to Sears. Defendant 
denied that he had possession of a ring. A pat-
down search was conducted with defendant's 
consent, but the ring was not found. The Salt 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Lake City Police Department was called, and 
Officer David Hendrix responded to the sus-
pected shoplifting. 
Officer Hendrix was joined at Sears by two 
other police officers. Because they were unsure 
how to proceed, Officer Hendrix called his 
supervisor, Sergeant Foster Mayo. When 
Sergeant Mayo arrived at Sears, a thorough 
search was conducted of the store parking lot 
where defendant had been first detained, and 
the surrounding area. Defendant then submi-
tted to a strip search but the ring was still not 
located. At this point, the police suspected 
that defendant had swallowed the ring. Serg-
eant Mayo telephoned the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office and the Salt Lake County 
Jail for advice, and decided to proceed with 
an X-ray search. If the X-ray showed def-
endant was not in possession of the ring, 
Sergeant Mayo intended to send more officers 
to conduct another search of the Sears parking 
lot. Having already been placed under arrest, 
defendant was transported in handcuffs to 
Holy Cross Hospital at approximately 6:30 
p.m. 
After arriving at Holy Cross Hospital,' def-
endant objected to being subjected to an X-
ray search. Three police officers who had 
accompanied defendant to the X-ray depar-
tment told defendant that he did not have a 
choice regarding the X-ray, at which point 
defendant became combative. The police off-
icers forcibly restrained defendant and the X-
raywas taken. There was a shape resembling a 
ring evident in the X-ray of defendant's 
stomach. The police then took defendant to 
the Salt Lake County Jail where arrangements 
were made to place him in an isolation cell. 
The ring eventually passed through his system 
and was retrieved by jail personnel. 
Defendant moved to suppress the X-ray 
and all evidence obtained after the X-ray was 
taken. Defendant argued that the warrantless 
bodily intrusion violated his fourth amend-
ment rights and that all evidence derived from 
the search should be suppressed. The State 
contended that the search was reasonable. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion .to sup-
press, finding that the presence of exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless search 
of defendant's body. 
On appeal, defendant reiterates his claim 
that the X-ray and all evidence thereafter 
obtained should have been suppressed. Speci-
fically, defendant argues that there were not 
exigent circumstances present to dispense with 
the warrant requirement; nothing clearly ind-
icated that the ring would be found inside of 
defendant; the X-ray was not a reasonable 
method for locating the ring; and the X-ray 
was not conducted in a reasonable manner. 
The State argues that the X-ray search was 
reasonable, but that even if the search violated 
defendant's rights, the ring was still admiss-
ible under the "inevitable discovery" rule. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a challenge to a 
lower court's suppression ruling was stated by 
this court in State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989): "In considering the trial 
court's action in denying defendant's motion 
to suppress, we will not disturb its factual 
evaluation unless its findings are clearly erro-
neous." Id. at 327. See also State v. Marshall, 
791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
"However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, we 
afford it no deference but apply a 'correction 
of error standard'." Johnson, 111 P.2d at 
327. 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
"Warrantless searches and seizures are per 
se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances 
require that the search be performed before a 
warrant can be obtained." State v. Christensen, 
616 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Since the 
police had no warrant to search defendant in 
the present case, the State had the burden of 
showing that the search was lawful. See State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). 
Both defendant and the State agree that in 
order to determine if a bodily search violates 
the fourth amendment, the applicable test is 
that articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court set out 
three requirements that must be met: (1) there 
are exigent circumstances that justify the 
warrantless bodily intrusion; (2) there is a 
clear indication that such evidence will be 
found; and (3) the method chosen is a reaso-
nable one, performed in a reasonable manner. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72. We address 
only the first requirement in this case, because 
we conclude that exigent circumstances were 
not present. 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, 
the court stated: 
[T]he evidence shows that there was 
such a high probability that 
[Palmer] had swallowed the ring 
because [the officers] had made a 
thorough search of everywhere. No 
avenues seemed left where it could 
be. However, since that is a possi-
bility that could exist, and because 
it was such a public place and 
because dark was approaching, that 
the circumstances were of such a 
nature as to require an immediate 
final determination in this regard 
and they were therefore justified in 
making this determination and not 
waiting for a search warrant. 
The trial court explicitly relied on People v. 
Williams, 157 111. App. 3d 996, 510 N.E.2d 
445 (1987). On similar facts, the Illinois Court 
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of Appeals held exigent circumstances were 
present since "lT]he deputies needed to know 
whether defendant had ingested the ring or 
whether they needed to begin a detailed search 
of every place defendant had been since his 
arrest." Id. at 448. We decline to follow the 
rationale of Williamst as it is contrary to est-
ablished Utah law. 
In Utah, in order to establish exigent circ-
umstances sufficient to justify a warrantless 
search the State must show either that the 
procurement of a warrant would have jeopa-
rdized the safety of the police officers or the 
public, or that the evidence was likely to have 
been lost or destroyed. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
470. "Once the threat that the suspect will 
injure the officers or will destroy the evidence 
is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the 
officers cannot take the time to secure a 
warrant." Id. See also Chimel v. California* 
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (warrantless 
searches only permitted to protect safety of 
police or public or to prevent destruction of 
evidence); State v. Ashey 745 P.2d 1255, 1259 
(Utah 1987) (where there was an interested 
party in the suspect's house who was aware 
police were approaching, exigent circumstances 
existed to allow warrantless entry of residence 
to prevent possible destruction of contraband); 
Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411 (for the warra-
ntless search of automobiles exception to 
apply, the police must have probable cause to 
believe that the evidence will be lost if not 
immediately seized). 
In Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court sim-
plified the search and seizure rules so that they 
could "be more easily followed by the police 
and the courts and, at the same time, provide 
the public with consistent and predictable 
protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. The court 
held: 
This can be accomplished by elim-
inating some of the confusing exc-
eptions to the warrant requirement 
.... [Warrantless searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy 
their traditional justif ication, 
namely [1] to protect the safety of 
police or the public or [2] to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. 
Id. at 469-470 (citations omitted). 
Describing when the second exigent circu-
mstance exception to the warrant requirement 
applies, the Larocco court said, "the police 
must have probable cause and believe that 
either contraband or evidence of a crime ... 
may be lost if not immediately seized." Id. at 
470 (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d at 
411). This definition of exigent circumstances 
parallels that stated in United States Supreme 
Court case law: that an arresting officer may 
search for and seize any evidence on the arr-
estee's person and in the area "within his 
Palmer CODE«CO 
civ. Rep. 42 Provo, Utah 
immediate control," in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction. Chimel 395 U.S. 
at 762-763. See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
769 (a lawful arrest may provide the arresting 
officer with the right to search for concealed 
weapons or evidence under the direct control 
of the accused). 
The possibility that the ring may have been 
discovered by some passerby or third person is 
not an exigent circumstance. See Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770 ("In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evidence will be 
found, these fundamental human interests 
require law officers to suffer the risk that such 
evidence may disappear unless there is an 
immediate search."); U.S. v. Corski, 852 F.2d 
692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1988) (warrantless search 
not justified by exigent circumstances where 
the evidence was inaccessible to suspects and 
there was no danger that it could be removed 
before a warrant was obtained). In his treatise 
on search and seizure, Professor LaFave cau-
tioned against such a broad formulation of 
exigent circumstances: "there is almost always 
a partisan who might destroy or conceal evi-
dence." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§6.5(b) at 656 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990) 
(quoting United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 978, 
979 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
There was also no justifiable reason to 
believe the ring would be destroyed by defen-
dant if he had swallowed it, as the State would 
have us believe. People v. Bracamonte, 15 
CalJrd 394, 540 P.2d 624, 631, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
528 (1975) (defendant seen to have swallowed 
two balloons which police suspected contained 
heroin; no justifiable reason to conduct war-
rantless search since evidence could be retri-
eved through "the ordinary processes of 
nature"). Compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
770-71 (it is impractical to obtain a search 
warrant due to the rapid dissipation of alcohol 
in defendant's bloodstream). 
The State could have easily obtained a 
warrant for this search. See United States v. 
Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in 
procuring a warrant, Utah has allowed for 
issuance of a search warrant based on a sworn 
telephonic statement of the officer seeking the 
warrant. Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) 
(1990). In light of the comparative ease with 
which a warrant can be obtained under Utah's 
telephonic warrant statute, little or no impe-
diment is presented to police investigations. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (quoting State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring)). 
Applying the Larocco analysis of exigent 
circumstances to the present case, we do not 
believe the circumstances were such as would 
justify a warrantless search. 
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INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
On appeal, the State argued that even if the 
warrantless X-ray of defendant were deter-
mined by this court to be unlawful, the ring 
which was subsequently seized by the police 
after it passed through defendant's system, 
was admissible under the "inevitable disco-
very" rule. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431 (1984). This court recognized inevi-
table discovery as an exception to the exclus-
ionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 
1288, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The State raised the theory of inevitable 
discovery below; however, since the trial court 
found that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless X-ray of defendant, the trial 
court did not have to decide the question of 
whether or not the ring inevitably would have 
been discovered. This court cannot properly 
determine the outcome of a fact-sensitive 
issue where the record below is not clear and 
uncontroverted, or capable of only one 
finding. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987). Issues that are presented in 
search and seizure cases are highly fact sensi-
tive. State v. Lovegren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 
10(Ct.App. 1990). 
Because we find that there were no exigent 
circumstances, the motion to suppress the X-
-ray was erroneously denied. As to the ring, we 
remand for the factual determination of 
whether the ring would have been inevitably 
discovered and for such other proceedings as 
may be appropriate. 
.Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
The State appeals from a November 1, 
1989, order of "dismissal with prejudice" 
entered at the close of appellee Todd 
Willard's bench trial for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
Because we conclude that the trial court's 
action constituted an acquittal, which is not 
appealable by the State, we dismiss the appeal. 
Deputies from the Sevier County Sheriffs 
Office set up a roadblock on March 10, 1988, 
to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registr-
ations. They stopped Willard, who provided 
them with a valid license and registration, and 
they eventually searched his vehicle and disc-
overed a controlled substance. Willard was 
charged with two counts of violating Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989). 
In accordance with Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), 
Willard filed a pretrial motion to suppress the 
seized contraband, which was denied by the 
trial court in January 1989. The case then 
proceeded to a bench trial in May 1989. 
After all the evidence was in and both sides 
presented closing arguments, Willard renewed 
his motion to suppress.1 The court granted the 
motion, ruling that (1) the continued detention 
of Willard, after the purpose for the roadb-
lock had been accomplished, was unreasonable 
and unconstitutional; and (2) Willard's 
consent in fact to the search of the vehicle was 
therefore irrelevant to the suppression issue. 
Counsel for the State prepared an order gra-
nting the motion to suppress, which was 
signed on September 19, 1989. Twenty-three 
days later, the State filed a "Motion for Cla-
rification" of the September order, ostensibly 
to determine if the court had intended it as an 
interlocutory order or as a "final order of 
dismissal," which the prosecutor claimed 
would be directly appealable under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 26(3)(a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-
35-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) (repealed by Utah 
Laws 1989, ch. 187, §15, effective July 1, 
1990; now see Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-
1(2) (Supp. 1990)). In response to the clarifi-
cation request, the court entered an order on 
November 1, 1989, dismissing the case with 
prejudice. The State then filed this direct 
appeal. 
In its appeal, the State does not claim error 
in the dismissal itself. Instead, it seeks review 
of the September 1989 suppression order, 
asserting that the fourth amendment analysis 
underlying the court's grant of the motion to 
suppress at trial is erroneous. Relying on State 
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and Stare 
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. 
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